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Abstract 
 
 
Dualism - the division of an object of study into separate, paired elements - is 
widespread in economic and social theorising: key examples are the divisions 
between agency and structure, the individual and society, mind and body, 
values and facts, and knowledge and practice.  In recent years, dualism has been 
criticised as exaggerating conceptual divisions and promoting an 
oversimplified, reductive outlook.  A possible alternative to dualism is the 
notion of duality, whereby the two elements are interdependent and no longer 
separate or opposed, although they remain conceptually distinct.  This paper 
argues that duality, if handled carefully, can provide a superior framework to 
dualism for dealing with the complexity of economic and social institutions.   
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Introduction 
 
Dualism - the division of an object of study into two paired elements - has been adopted 
widely by economic and social theorists.  Setting up a dualism offers the simplest form of 
categorisation and an easy way to draw the contrast between separate and perhaps opposed 
aspects of a single topic.  Key dualisms, around which much social science has been 
organised, are the divisions between agency and structure, the individual and society, and 
micro and macro levels of analysis.  At times theorising has converged on one pole of a 
dualism and neglected the other: mainstream economics, for instance, has favoured 
individualistic ideas, while mainstream sociology has favoured a structural emphasis.  
Dualisms can provide symmetrical frameworks that simplify academic work, supposedly 
capture crucial facets of reality, and partition a discipline into separate areas, such as 
microeconomics and macroeconomics, within which specialised study can take place.  
Dualistic modes of thought have become so ingrained in academic work that theorists often 
employ them unconsciously without asking whether or not they are desirable. 
 
    In recent years, the dualistic approach to social science has been heavily criticised.  The 
appeal to two separate, unchanging elements seems oversimplified and may be too 
restrictive to encompass the complexity and diversity of modern societies.  A strict contrast 
and opposition of elements limits the possible interrelationships within social theory.  
Responding to these criticisms, social theorists have explored new approaches that 
transcend the traditional dualisms underlying social analysis.  One such approach relies on 
the concept of duality, which envisages stronger and richer interactions of paired elements 
than occur in a dualism.  Whether duality-based and other non-dualistic approaches 
represent a major advance is debatable, but they do at least provoke theorists to think about 
the nature and value of dualism.  The simplicity of conventional dualisms might have been 
bought at too great a cost. 
 
    The debates over dualism are relevant to all social science, including economics, despite 
the fact that mainstream economics, wedded as it is to neoclassical methods, has been 
 - 2 - 
 
oblivious of them.  This paper considers the role of dualism in economics and the case for 
adopting non-dualistic theory through concepts like duality.  Economic and social theorists, 
it will be argued, have a better chance of depicting the complexity of economic institutions 
if they understand the drawbacks of dualism and seek alternatives to dualistic thought. 
 
 
 
 
Dualism 
 
Dualism has several features present in virtually all dualistic approaches.  Its first and 
defining feature is its doubleness: analysis proceeds by identifying two basic elements.  
These must, of course, be different from each other, and the dualism usually aims to make a 
vital contrast that throws light on the topic under discussion.  The contrast must be clear-cut 
and decisive in order to justify the dualism's twofold character.  Dualism involves 
separation of the two elements, so that they have a well-defined boundary and no shared 
territory: connections between them are either non-existent or of a modest kind that leaves 
them unchanged and preserves their essential separation.  Often separation becomes 
synonymous with opposition and potential conflict between the two elements.  Opposition 
may not be inherent in dualism, but many dualistic approaches embody internal frictions.  
Dualism creates a cleavage and thereby encourages tension between the two parts of the 
object of study. 
 
    For a dualism to work properly, it must be comprehensive.  It can have no middle ground 
between the two elements; otherwise the direct contrast would be lost and the analysis 
would no longer be dualistic.  When it addresses a single object of study, the object must be 
divided cleanly into two separate parts that adjoin each other and exclude any middle 
ground.  When it has a classificatory function, objects must be divided unambiguously 
between classes with no cases belonging to both.  Successful dualistic classes should be 
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mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  As well as there being no middle ground, there must be 
no external ground beyond the two elements in question.  If an object of study falls outside 
the dualism, then there will be at least one other element and analysis can no longer be 
conducted in dualistic terms.  Anyone hoping to set up a dualism has to ensure that the two 
elements cover the whole of the object of study and do not overlap. 
 
    Most dualisms are intended to be fundamental, so as to draw universal contrasts relevant 
in all times and places.  Exceptions to a dualism imply that its elements are partial and 
capable of relaxation, losing their generality and with it much of their value.  If the dualistic 
elements in a particular application can change, transform themselves and shed their 
doubleness, then the rationale of dualism is undermined.  The elements of a dualism 
frequently seem to be in conflict, yet their opposition cannot culminate in one defeating the 
other or both undergoing essential changes.  Dualistic methods are not dialectical, that is to 
say, they do not allow for the conflict of opposites leading to a synthesis that removes the 
initial dualism.  Normally, dualisms say little about dynamics or historical change: the 
conditions for change remain unspecified.  Fluidity of the elements might destabilise the 
analysis and, if it went far enough, threaten the existence of the dualism. 
 
    The dualisms observed in social theory have strong affinities and tend to reinforce one 
another.  Parallel dualisms are the divisions between people and nature, the individual and 
society, subjective and objective, thought and action, idealism and materialism, mind and 
body, knowledge and practice, and values and facts (Sayer, 1992, Chapter 1).  In all of 
these cases, the first term has a humanistic, idealist slant, whereas the second has a natural, 
material slant.  Meanings derived from one dualism spill over into the related dualisms, 
causing dualistic thought to pervade large areas of social science.  Taken together, the 
dualisms yield a broad conceptual gulf separating individual human beings from their social 
and natural context.  Once established, dualism becomes habit forming and may be 
presupposed without deliberation.  It has a transformative quality which allows it to appear 
in many guises that nevertheless reflect a common dualistic vision. 
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    Dualism goes with a formal, rationalist style of academic work.  The fixed elements and 
universality of dualistic thought exemplify the closed, Cartesian methods found widely in 
the natural and social sciences.  By pointing out simple but fundamental properties of their 
objects of study, dualisms hope to attain the ultimate goal of uncomplicated, accurate 
explanatory theorising.  Through formal theory alone, they can supposedly reveal reality, 
and nothing can come from outside the model to challenge the basic theoretical 
conclusions.  If they are to take in all observed events and historical changes without 
themselves changing, dualisms must be constructed in the most general terms.  Dualism is 
sometimes regarded as the epitome of the Cartesian, rationalist method and set against more 
open-ended alternatives (Dow, 1985, 1990).  Strictly speaking, dualism is not equivalent to 
rationalism, and one can be a rationalist without being a dualist or a dualist without being a 
rationalist.  Most dualisms do, however, fit into the rationalist tradition of formal 
theoretical explanation. 
 
 
 
 
Dualistic thought in economics 
 
Economics, imitating the natural sciences, has always been receptive to dualistic 
approaches.  Neoclassical economics in particular has placed a high value on formal 
theoretical foundations, which has left it prone to the influence of dualistic thought.  
Constructing theories from axiomatic first principles means that the underlying 
assumptions must be simple or else theorising would be impossible.  Dualism is one of the 
simplest theoretical abstractions, and so axiomatic theorising is often dualistic.  Most 
neoclassical economists are probably unaware of their dualistic stance and do not overtly 
promote dualism, but they do, all the same, uphold dualism in both their theory and their 
methods: examples are the divisions between microeconomics and macroeconomics, 
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markets and planning, theoretical and empirical work, and normative and positive 
economics.  Discussion here will concentrate on the dualism of agency and structure, only 
one dualism among others but at the heart of economic and social theory. 
 
    The basic neoclassical model starts free of social structure by assuming a population of 
rational, utility maximising agents.  As the aim is to build complete axiomatic models from 
individualistic first principles, the ideal neoclassical case would eliminate structural 
concepts from economic theory.  Much neoclassical work fails to attain this aim and at 
some stage has to accommodate structural ideas, either directly through institutional 
restrictions on individual behaviour or indirectly through, say, informational deficiencies or 
exogenous expectations.  Within the individualistic framework of neoclassical economics, 
social structures can appear only as constraints on rational individual behaviour.  Recourse 
to structural arguments embarrasses neoclassical economists because it stops them from 
reaching their aim of individualistic explanation and destroys the purity and elegance of the 
neoclassical model.  They admit social structure only reluctantly as an ad hoc imperfection 
that may be convenient for certain localised purposes but should be avoided wherever 
possible and never assimilated with their theoretical vision.  In models built up from a 
given set of rational individuals, agency and structure must be separate and opposed.  The 
neoclassical wish for individualistic theory guarantees that the individualistic side of this 
dualism is dominant and structural ideas have only a precarious foothold. 
 
    In policy debates, the opposition between individual agency and social structure 
translates into an opposition between markets and planning.  According to neoclassical 
doctrine, rational individuals interact via markets or market-like transactions to produce 
Pareto-efficient outcomes.  Neoclassical theory, with its idealised view of efficient markets, 
underpins the mainstream case for a market economy.  Governments or any intermediate 
institutions are omitted from the basic model and play no part in the attainment of 
economic efficiency.  The smallest amount of government planning would be enough to 
spoil the perfection of market equilibria: markets and planning are incompatible.  Those 
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neoclassical models that include government intervention and other imperfections operate 
in a 'second-best' environment clearly distinguished from the 'first-best' environment of a 
perfectly competitive economy.  Second-best models, as adopted for example in public 
economics, acknowledge that government intervention may offset other imperfections, but 
they lack the theoretical elegance of the standard model and soon become analytically 
intractable when a more realistic institutional setting is introduced.  Always in the 
background lies the belief that second-best situations are, indeed, second best and that the 
ideal option would be to remove imperfections and return to the first-best case.  
Paradoxically, if one replaces perfect competition with perfect central planning by an 
omniscient and omnipotent government, then the outcome will still be Pareto efficient.  
Neoclassical theory could have been used to advocate central planning under assumptions 
that are implausible but not dramatically more so than perfect competition.  The framework 
of neoclassical economics is well suited to the neat, idealised modelling of the extreme 
cases of perfect competition and perfect central planning; it finds it much harder to cope 
with the messy middle ground where markets and planning are combined.  Unfortunately 
for neoclassical economics, actual economies - whether they are nominally market, mixed 
or planned - are located in this middle ground. 
 
    Institutional and non-neoclassical economics differ from the mainstream in (among other 
things) the greater importance they ascribe to institutions and social structure.  Institutional 
economics has generally turned away from strict individualism towards a more structural 
outlook, in which the social and institutional context exerts a prime influence on economic 
activity.  The preference for structural approaches is by no means inevitable, however; the 
'new institutional economics' keeps faith with individualistic, neoclassical theory (Dugger, 
1990; Hodgson, 1989; Rutherford, 1994).  When institutional approaches do reject 
individualism and put forward structural arguments, they will not necessarily reject 
dualism.  As structure acquires greater importance, institutional economics may converge 
on the structurally dominated modes of thought that have characterised mainstream 
sociology.  A theory where structure governs behaviour stands at the opposite pole of the 
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agency/structure dualism to that occupied by neoclassical economics; institutions restrain 
individuals and emasculate human agency.  While undeniably 'institutional', a purely 
structural outlook is no less one-sided than the individualism of neoclassical economics.  If 
institutional and other non-neoclassical approaches are to escape dualism, they cannot rely 
solely on structural arguments as the means to accentuate institutions.  Overcoming dualism 
requires a truly non-dualistic framework, and the idea of duality may supply this. 
 
 
 
 
Duality 
 
Duality as an alternative to dualism is set out in Giddens's writings on the 'duality of 
structure' (Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1984).  A duality resembles a dualism in that it retains two 
essential elements but, unlike a dualism, the two elements are interdependent and no longer 
separate or opposed, even though they are conceptually distinct (otherwise the duality 
would be a unity).  Social theorists who invoke duality can maintain conceptual distinctions 
without being committed to a rigid antagonism or separation of the two elements being 
distinguished.  Compared with traditional dualisms, duality should give rise to more 
even-handed, less restrictive accounts of social and economic behaviour.  The objective is 
to preserve the valuable attributes of dualism and improve on its less valuable attributes. 
 
    Dualism forms part of Giddens's structuration theory, which has greatly influenced 
recent sociology (Giddens, 1984).  The theory aims to transcend the old dualistic 
approaches that usually endorsed a structural view and left hardly any leeway for individual 
agency.  Structuration theory strengthens agency against structure by looking towards the 
more interpretative, individualistic strands in sociology.  The concept of structuration refers 
to the conditions governing the continuity or transformation of social structures.  Instead of 
agency and structure standing separate and opposed, they are brought together in a 'duality 
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of structure': structures can be reproduced and transformed only through agency, and agents 
can come into existence only within a structured environment.  Agency and structure are 
treated as distinct but thoroughly interdependent; they cannot exist separately and are best 
portrayed as a duality, not a dualism.  In traditional social theory, as well as neoclassical 
economics, structure merely restricts or moulds agents, so that the agency/structure relation 
is an opposition.  In structuration theory, structures can play an enabling role: people's 
capabilities depend on their social surroundings.  Structure may at times constrain agents, 
but it is also pivotal to the enhancement of their powers and the development of culture.  
Once structure no longer opposes agency, the pressures to move to one dualistic pole or the 
other are reduced.  Duality, as interpreted by Giddens, pulls structure and agency closer 
together and stresses their interdependence without going as far as to merge them into a 
single entity. 
 
    Giddens is not the only author to argue for the reconciliation of agency and structure: 
such considerations have been widespread in recent sociological debate.  The various 
versions of the argument are expressed in different terminology and do not correspond 
exactly, but they share the goal of overcoming the agency/structure dualism.  Within 
sociology, the work of Elias and Bourdieu contains the chief alternative accounts to that of 
Giddens.  Elias's social theory centres on the concept of 'figuration', which refers to actual 
agents and their interactions, rather than the institutional structures found in traditional 
approaches (Elias, 1991).  Figuration avoids a dichotomy of agency and structure, as it 
relies on the direct relations among agents; individuals can be understood only through 
their place in social networks, and nothing can be gained by analysing individuals in 
isolation from their social context or society in isolation from individual agents.  Bourdieu's 
writings that address the agency/structure issue are based on the idea of 'habitus', defined as 
the individual's stock of accumulated social knowledge and experience (Bourdieu, 1977, 
1990).  According to Bourdieu, habitus can explain human conduct: people's internal 
dispositions derived from their past socialisation ensure the constancy of social practices 
over time.  As with the work of Elias, this approach claims to study individual agents while 
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giving due attention to their social surroundings, thereby avoiding the agency/structure 
dualism.  Another example of non-dualistic social theorising, coming this time from outside 
sociology, is the 'transformational model of social activity¶ (Bhaskar, 1979).  Bhaskar's 
model, part of his realist interpretation of social science, resembles structuration theory in 
viewing social structure as the ever-present condition and continually reproduced outcome 
of human agency.  Despite substantial differences of detail and terminology, all of these 
non-dualistic, non-reductionist approaches to social theory stem from the same perceived 
problems and argue for similar methods of tackling them.  The close resemblance of 
independently produced work shows the general desire for a new, non-dualistic perspective. 
 
    Cultural theory provides a further source of non-dualistic ideas.  Culture, when defined 
as a process, denotes the growth of individual agents within society and hence links 
individual agency to social structure.  In fact, non-reductionist social theory uses culture as 
the connecting tissue in its duality (without always acknowledging this) and mirrors 
modern, sociological approaches to culture, which argue that all aspects of human 
behaviour, from high culture to everyday life, are cultural in character (Williams, 1981).  
With its broad outlook, cultural theory goes somewhat beyond the bounds of Giddens's 
model, especially when it roots human behaviour in material nature, yielding the cultural 
materialism that has informed both anthropological and literary work on culture (Jackson, 
1996).  Non-dualistic social theory can be embedded in a general, stratified conception of 
reality, a view put forward explicitly in the realist social science of Bhaskar (1979) and 
implicitly in the cultural materialism of Williams (1977) and Harris (1979).  The notion of 
duality, which has emerged only in the last twenty years or so, chimes with much older 
traditions of cultural theorising.  At present, 'cultural studies' is a rapidly expanding 
discipline, and the revived interest in culture can be taken to indicate the significance of 
new, non-dualistic modes of analysis. 
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Arguments against duality 
 
The recent work on duality and related concepts has been discussed extensively in the 
sociological literature.  Many sociologists have welcomed duality and accepted that it can 
redress structural biases, but it has nonetheless been much criticised.  The central argument 
of most critics is that, in curtailing the role of social structure, duality-based approaches go 
too far in the other direction and end up with social theory dominated by individual agency.  
While happy with a shift towards agency, the critics claim that duality fails to find the right 
balance between agency and structure. 
 
    Giddens's work on the duality of structure faces difficulties over his definition of 
structure, which differs from the normal sociological one.  The normal use of the word 
'structure' hinges on an analogy with physical structures external to individual agents; social 
structure constitutes the social system of institutions within which individuals act.  
Giddens, however, distinguishes social structure from the social system and defines 
structure as the rules and resources exploited by agents in in producing and reproducing a 
social system over time; rules receive pride of place as the medium and outcome of social 
interaction.  When Giddens writes of the 'duality of structure', he is concerned with 
structures underlying human behaviour, rather than any particular set of institutions.  The 
definition of structure comes nearer to that in structural linguistics or anthropology than to 
that in sociology.  Giddens's definition, his critics argue, can be misleading and too narrow 
to be useful in social theorising (Callinicos, 1985; Layder, 1987, 1994).  If the duality of 
structure does not apply to conventional notions of structure, then its relevance for social 
theory diminishes correspondingly and it will confuse social theory instead of clarifying it.  
Giddens's rule-bound, linguistic concept of structure has been seen as too close to human 
agency, on which it depends for its efficacy.  Although structure can both enable and 
constrain human behaviour, the constraints take the limited form of rules and resources 
affecting individual conduct and are therefore internalised to human action.  The possibility 
of structure being an external constraint on individual behaviour has been lost and, as a 
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result, structure has been seriously weakened.  These criticisms pertain to Giddens's 
concept of structure and do not extend to the basic principles of duality: most critics 
approve of close agency/structure interdependence, with structure defined more 
conventionally. 
 
    A related criticism of duality is that the bringing together of agency and structure is 
vulnerable to a reductionism whereby one (usually agency) dominates the other.  Giddens 
took his ideas from interpretative approaches to sociology and aimed quite explicitly to 
upgrade agency, thus redressing the bias towards structural methods.  This could, according 
to critics, have gone too far; when structures are rules and exist only by virtue of individual 
agency, then the theory seems to have become individualistic in character and abandoned 
the prospect of structures constraining action (Archer, 1990; Callinicos, 1985; Thompson, 
1989).  If so, then Giddens may have conceded too much to interpretative, subjectivist 
methods and lost the benefits of a proper concept of structure.  The attempt to transcend the 
agency/structure dualism could merely reinstate it in different terminology and diminish the 
role of structure to a point where the theory collapses into subjectivist individualism.  
Achieving a duality requires a delicate touch and, it is argued, Giddens has pushed things 
too far towards agency.  The argument, as before, is over the particular content of Giddens's 
approach, not the idea of duality.  Alternative duality-based theories, such as that of 
Bhaskar, can sustain a stronger notion of social structure and give more credence to its 
negative role in constraining individual agency (Bhaskar, 1993, Chapter 2).  Giddens's 
critics accuse him of merging agency and structure into a unity, notwithstanding his choice 
of the term 'duality' and his declared intention to be even-handed (Layder, 1994).  Whatever 
the truth of the argument, there remains the need to complete Giddens's task and achieve a 
genuine duality in social theorising. 
 
    Other critics have suggested that dualism and duality can coexist and that neither on its 
own suffices as the basis for social theorising (Mouzelis, 1989, 1995).  From this 
perspective, people in different social locations experience different relations between 
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agency and structure.  People in authority at the top of a social hierarchy are likely to 
experience a duality of structure: they have a personal involvement in formulating policy, 
and their individual and collective agency is closely tied to the production and reproduction 
of the social institutions around them.  People at the bottom of a hierarchy are likely to 
experience a dualism: they do not identify with the institutions around them, have little 
influence on the formation of policy, and feel constrained by the social environment in 
which they live and work.  Duality and dualism may be relevant in different circumstances, 
and the social theorist should be free to invoke either according to the object of study.  
Duality, Mouzelis argues, is a valuable idea but less general in its applicability than 
Giddens and other social theorists have implied; some aspects of social and economic 
analysis might still benefit from the older ideas of dualism, with their stronger, externalised 
versions of structure and an opposition between structure and agency.  Once again, the 
main concern is to defend a sturdier notion of structure and recognise that people can be 
restricted by external institutional constraints. 
 
    Both the proponents and critics of duality in social theory have realised the need for a 
thoroughgoing interdependence of agency and structure.  Their disagreements boil down to 
the precise definition of social structures and the place of individual agency in renewing or 
changing them.  Agency/structure interdependence may still permit a continuum of 
emphases varying with the theoretical views of the investigator and perhaps also the topic 
under investigation.  The debate over duality is partly a question of semantics.  For some 
commentators, duality merges agency and structure to make them different sides of a single 
thing, whereas dualism keeps two separate elements of agency and structure that could 
nevertheless be interdependent (Layder, 1994).  These definitions contradict the ones 
adopted in the present paper, which treats duality as two distinct, interdependent elements 
and dualism as two distinct, unrelated or opposed elements.  Presumably some critics of 
'single-thing' duality would be happy with 'interdependent-elements' duality, and in the end 
it matters little whether one refers to a duality or an interdependent dualism (though it 
seems better to reserve the term duality for this particular sort of dualism).  The main 
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arguments in social theory seem to be about the nature and strength of the interdependence 
within a duality (or, if one prefers, dualism), not about whether the interdependence should 
exist at all. 
 
 
 
 
Ways of dealing with complexity 
 
Social and economic theory tries to portray a complex reality in a clear, manageable 
fashion capable of illuminating the object of study.  The theory should not be so restrictive 
that it permanently excludes important features of reality, but should not be so general that 
it lacks content.  This is the perennial dilemma of social theory: general approaches may 
say little and appear vacuous, while specific approaches may foster reductionism.  When 
formulating general theory, one should be cautious and retain an open, non-reductionist 
framework that embraces more detailed theorising for particular applications and prevents 
the overall perspective from being unduly restrictive.  Regardless of the disputes over 
dualism and duality, social theorists mostly agree on looking for a non-reductive 
compromise between agency and structure.  As societies become increasingly complex, 
social theory must be able to deal with complexity; reductive approaches are oversimplified 
and ill-equipped to represent modern economies or societies. 
 
    Most social theories revolve around the two conceptual elements of agency and structure 
or a variant of them, such as the individual and society or micro and macro levels of 
analysis.  The intention is to depict the relations between the part and the whole, that is, 
between the individual human being and the society or social institution to which he or she 
belongs.  Two conceptual elements are the minimum possible for a pluralist, non-monist 
scheme, and theories with more than two elements or with additional superimposed 
dualisms would inevitably be more complex.  Even for theories with two elements, the 
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relation between the elements is often a vexed question, as the dualism/duality controversy 
demonstrates.  When the number of conceptual elements increases, the number of relations 
rises dramatically and so does the difficulty of modelling.  Unless one single relation 
dominates, there will be far more interrelationships or combinations of characteristics to be 
modelled.  Greater intricacy and difficulty of theory offsets the prospect of greater richness, 
breadth and depth. 
 
    The agency/structure dualism possesses an attractive simplicity and might be felt to 
delineate the bedrock of human behaviour without the need for additional or alternative 
concepts.  It would be a little surprising, though, if social theory with only two conceptual 
elements could encompass all human behaviour.  The 'law of requisite variety', when 
applied to social theorising, suggests that a complex object of study will require complex, 
diverse theory with a sufficiently large number of conceptual elements (Ashby, 1968).  
Many aspects of human behaviour and social institutions are not well portrayed by agency 
or structure.  Consider, for example, the influence of human biology on the physical and 
mental capabilities of individuals.  All human beings experience biological ageing that 
influences their behaviour but is due to neither agency - people do not choose to grow old - 
nor structure - social institutions do not cause ageing.  The rate at which people's 
capabilities decline with age depends partly on their behaviour and social context, but a 
third factor outside agency and structure determines biological ageing.  Another example of 
a third factor is the influence of nature and the environment.  Human behaviour can never 
be cut off from the material world, and the interdependence of behaviour and the 
environment may be germane to social analysis.  Relying exclusively on the 
agency/structure dualism (or duality) can easily become anthropocentric and overlook the 
natural context within which behaviour takes place; consciously adopting a naturalistic 
perspective can reduce this danger (Jackson, 1995; Khalil, 1995).  To situate human 
behaviour in its natural context will entail stratified modelling in which human agents and 
social structure are just two levels of analysis among others.  Levels can be treated as 
interdependent and characterised by emergent powers, so that any one level cannot be 
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reduced to the others.  Within this framework, two interdependent levels might be singled 
out for analytical purposes as a dualism or duality, but they do not exist in isolation from 
the framework as a whole and will be subject to extraneous influences from the other, 
missing levels. 
 
    Besides adding levels, one can also subdivide structure and agency to give a more 
extensive analytical framework.  Structure, in particular, may benefit from theoretical 
elaboration.  It may be worth distinguishing between 'institutional structures' that bind 
together institutions and 'figurational structures' that bind together individual agents; the 
former correspond to the structural concepts of Talcott Parsons and much conventional 
sociology, the latter to Elias's notion of a 'figuration' (Mouzelis, 1995).  Introducing this 
distinction raises the issue of how institutional and figurational structures are connected and 
weakens the simple agency/structure pairing.  Duality of structure should ideally cover both 
types of structure and not dwell on one or the other.  A further theoretical elaboration 
would be to delve deeper into the nature of structural relationships.  The grid-group model 
of Mary Douglas, for instance, classifies societies according to their grid properties, the 
externally imposed restrictions on individuals, and their group properties, the extent to 
which individuals are incorporated in groups (Douglas, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990).  The 
properties can be combined, and a model with high and low levels of each property has four 
combinations, plus a fifth case where neither property holds.  Individuals or social groups 
can be located anywhere within the scheme or outside it; they can move between the 
compartments, and a society may comprise different proportions of individuals in different 
compartments.  The agency/structure question is augmented by the additional question of a 
person's location within the non-dualistic grid-group scheme.  Social structure has grown 
from a single concept to a fourfold typology. 
 
     One can also increase the number of conceptual elements in social theorising by 
avoiding false parallels between dualisms.  The agency/structure dualism often becomes 
conflated with the individual/society and micro/macro dualisms: agency exists at the 
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individual, micro level, structure at the societal, macro level.  Avoiding the parallel brings 
the prospect of macro as well as micro actors and micro as well as macro structures; a 
twofold scheme enlarges to give a fourfold scheme (Mouzelis, 1995).  Thus, individuals 
who wield power in a government or multinational corporation are macro agents whose 
actions will have significant consequences nationally or internationally.  Ordinary people, 
on the other hand, are micro agents whose actions have little influence beyond their 
immediate social circumstances.  Likewise, social structures need not be macro structures 
and may refer to small-scale social groups or institutions.  If macro agency and structure 
differ from their micro counterparts, then it becomes important to stress the conceptual 
distinction and consider the multiple relationships among the four conceptual elements.  
Disengaging parallel dualisms will transform a dualistic scheme into a scheme with at least 
four components. 
 
    What are the implications of the debates over duality for economic theorising?  Most 
economic theory is less general than social or sociological theory and confined to those 
social activities perceived as being 'economic'.  Even so, it remains true that economic 
analysis exists within a broader study of social activity and that the prevailing forms of 
social theory have a bearing on economic theory.  Neoclassical economics sidesteps these 
conceptual matters when it declares the special character of economic behaviour, asserts the 
claims of rational-choice theory to explain such behaviour, and then divorces itself from the 
views of sociologists and social theorists.  The upshot is the widespread dualism of agency 
versus structure, micro versus macro, and markets versus planning that pervades 
neoclassical discussion.  For anyone wanting to overcome these dualisms and clear the path 
to a more open, less restrictive type of theorising, the context of economic behaviour is 
crucial and theoretical abstractions useful for some purposes should not be allowed to 
outstretch their usefulness and hamper the whole discipline.  The duality debate can help to 
soften the rigidities that have marred both conventional sociological theory and neoclassical 
economics.  In emphasising the interdependence of agency and structure, duality-based 
approaches ensure that both will be fully appreciated in social (and thus economic) 
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theorising and that neither will be neglected or minimised.  Consequently, duality-based 
social theory can act as a non-reductionist theoretical background to institutional and 
non-neoclassical economics. 
 
    The chief value of duality resides in the close interdependence of its elements, not in the 
twinning of agency and structure.  One might wish to subdivide agency and structure or 
introduce other factors, creating theory without a twofold character.  Interdependence of 
factors might resemble that depicted in duality-based social theory but might not conform 
to a simple agency/structure duality.  Little significance should be attached to the 
doubleness of the agency/structure juxtaposition, which does not extend to more general, 
stratified theory or to more specific theory in economics and elsewhere.  What matters is 
the close interdependence, falling short of identity, of the theory's constituent elements.  
Complexity can best be dealt with through flexible theory that maintains conceptual 
distinctions but gives due weight to the diverse, multiform character of modern societies.  
One should be willing to expand the number of theoretical elements when necessary.  
Arguments against dualism should be pitted against doubleness as well as against 
separation and opposition.  It is not enough merely to break down the internal barriers of a 
dualism, since this can be misrepresented as a simplifying move designed to amalgamate 
the two conceptual elements.  The basic problem of dualism is that it oversimplifies and 
constrains social theory, and the remedy is to obtain the requisite degree of complexity by 
having intricate, two-way relations between concepts and adding further conceptual levels 
where appropriate.  In economics this would mean a more complex vision than the 
neoclassical model, with more levels or elements and more complex relations among them.  
Such a vision does not have to take an axiomatic form and can be left as a general 
framework or set of guiding principles.  Rejecting dualism and accepting a complex, 
stratified view of reality could clarify the nature of institutional economics and highlight its 
affinities with general social theory. 
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Conclusion 
 
Duality, if handled carefully, can be preferable to dualism as a conceptual vehicle for 
economic theorising.  It preserves the same essential distinction as the corresponding 
dualism, while making its conceptual elements interdependent and inseparable, and 
safeguards theorists against reductionism, because they cannot ignore one element of the 
duality and concentrate exclusively on the other.  A possible risk is that the two elements 
become merged into a unity, leading back to reductionism, but any such risk will be 
minimised if the elements are clearly defined.  One can bolster the distinction between 
agency and structure within a duality if one adopts a concept of structure stronger and 
broader than Giddens's.  A more serous weakness of duality-based approaches is the 
restriction to only two elements, which may be insufficient to capture the relevant aspects 
of human behaviour.  The duality principle can be generalised, however, as it does not 
depend on a single relation between paired elements.  A stratified model can have more 
than two levels or elements that are conceptually distinct and interdependent.  To deal with 
the complexity of modern societies and diminish the risks of reductionism, it may be 
desirable to increase the number of conceptual elements above two.  The attraction of 
duality is not so much its doubleness as its ability to envisage a thoroughgoing 
interdependence of conceptually distinct elements. 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Archer, M. (1990), µHuman agency and social structure: a critique of Giddens¶, in Clark, J., 
Modgil, C. and Modgil, S. (Eds), Anthony Giddens: Consensus and Controversy, The 
Falmer Press, London. 
 
Ashby, W.R. (1968), µVariety, constraint, and the law of requisite variety¶, in Buckley, W. 
(Ed.), Modern Systems Reserch for the Behavioral Scientist, Aldine, Chicago. 
 - 19 - 
 
 
Bhaskar, R. (1979), The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophic Critique of the 
Contemporary Human Sciences, Harvester, Brighton. 
 
Bhaskar, R. (1993), Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, Verso, London. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1977), Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1990), The Logic of Practice, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
 
Callinicos, A.T. (1985), µAnthony Giddens: a contemporary critique¶, Theory and Society, 
Vol. 14, pp. 133-66. 
 
Douglas, M. (1982), µCultural bias¶, in Douglas, M. (Ed.), In the Active Voice, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London. 
 
Dow, S.C. (1985), Macroeconomic Thought: A Methodological Approach, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford. 
 
Dow, S.C. (1990), µBeyond dualism¶, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, 
pp. 143-57. 
 
Dugger, W.M. (1990), µThe new institutionalism: new but not institutionalist¶, Journal of 
Economic Issues, Vol. 24, pp. 423-31. 
 
Elias, N. (1991), The Society of Individuals, Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Giddens, A. (1976), New Rules of Sociological Method, Hutchinson, London. 
 
Giddens, A. (1979), Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and 
Contradiction in Social Analysis, Macmillan, London. 
 
Giddens, A. (1984), The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, 
Polity Press, Cambridge. 
 
Harris, M. (1979), Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture, Random 
House, New York. 
 
Hodgson, G.M. (1989), µInstitutional economic theory: the old versus the new¶, Review of 
Political Economy, Vol. 1, pp. 249-69. 
 
Jackson, W.A. (1995), µNaturalism in economics¶, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 29, 
pp. 761-80. 
 - 20 - 
 
 
Jackson, W.A. (1996), µCultural materialism and institutional economics¶, Review of Social 
Economy, Vol. 54, pp. 221-44. 
 
Khalil, E.L. (1995), µOrganizations, naturalism and complexity¶, Review of Social 
Economy, Vol. 53, pp. 393-419. 
 
Layder, D. (1987), µKey issues in structuration theory¶, Current Perspectives in Social 
Theory, Vol. 8, pp. 25-46. 
 
Layder, D. (1994), Understanding Social Theory, Sage, London. 
 
Mouzelis, N. (1989), µRestructuring structuration theory¶, Sociological Review, Vol. 37, 
pp. 613-35. 
 
Mouzelis, N. (1995), Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong?, Routledge, London. 
 
Rutherford, M. (1994), Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New Institutionalism, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Sayer, A. (1992), Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, 2nd edn, Routledge, 
London. 
 
Thompson, J.B. (1989), µThe theory of structuration¶, in Held, D. and Thompson, J.B. 
(Eds), Social Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and his Critics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Thompson, M., Ellis, R. and Wildavsky, A. (1990), Cultural Theory, Westview Press, 
Boulder, CO. 
 
Williams, R. (1977), Marxism and Literature, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Williams, R. (1981), Culture, Fontana Press, London. 
